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Abstract
In a model where individuals with different levels of skills exert different
levels of effort, we propose to use individuals’ minimal rights to divide an
extra amount of income generated by a change in the skill profile. Priority
is given to individuals with a positive minimal right which ensures that
the way redistribution is performed depends on the total sum of income
available in society. We characterize two families of Minimal Rights based
Egalitarian mechanisms. One family guarantees each individual her claim
when claims are feasible. The other family guarantees a non-negative
income after redistribution for all individuals.
JEL Classification: D63.
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1 Introduction
Suppose income inequalities are determined by unequal exerted effort levels and
different innate skills. The goal of fair income redistribution is to guarantee an
equal income for individuals exerting the same effort (the principle of compen-
sation) and to perform equal income transfers to individuals with equal skills
(the principle of natural reward). In an illuminating series of papers, Fleurbaey
(1994, 1995a,b,c,d), Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) show that
in many contexts there does not exist a redistribution mechanism that satisfies
both the principle of compensation and the principle of natural reward simulta-
neously. Subsequently, by proposing different trade-offs between both principles,
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the literature has characterized many different families of fair redistribution
mechanisms. Notably, most contributions have opted for a weakening of the
principle of natural reward rather than for a weakening of the principle of com-
pensation; see again Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a,b,c,d), Bossert (1995) and Bossert
and Fleurbaey (1996) but also Iturbe (1997), Sprumont (1997) and Tungodden
(2005). We refer to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007) for an extensive overview of
the different families of fair redistribution mechanisms proposed. Two families
play a benchmark role in this paper. It concerns (i) the family of Egalitarian
Equivalent mechanisms owing to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and Fleurbaey
(1995c) and (ii) the family of Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent mechanisms
owing to Iturbe (1997). These two families are respectively characterized by
Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) and Iturbe (1997) in a very comprehensible way.
First, the principle of compensation is strenghtened to the ethical principle
of ‘Solidarity’ which can be traced back to the seminal contribution of Rawls
(1971). Suppose that a change in the skill profile of society generates an extra
amount (or a loss) of pre-tax income. Solidarity requires that all incomes change
in the same direction when going from the final income distribution before the
change in the skill profile to the final income distribution after the change in
the skill profile. Second, Solidarity is strenghtened in ‘Additive Solidarity’ and
‘Multiplicative Solidarity’ successively. When going from the final income distri-
bution before the change in the skill profile to the final income distribution after
the change in the skill profile, Additive Solidarity requires that the absolute in-
come differences remain constant whereas Multiplicative Solidarity requires that
the relative income differences remain constant. Third, the principle of natu-
ral reward is weakened to the ethical principle of ‘Equal Transfer for Reference
Skill’. This axiom requires that equal income transfers are performed when the
skill level of all individuals equals one particular ‘reference’ skill. The reference
skill is assumed to be exogenously determined by the social planner. Then, a
redistribution mechanism satisfies Additive Solidarity and Equal Transfer for
Reference Skill if and only if it is an Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism and a
redistribution mechanism satisfies Multiplicative Solidarity and Equal Trans-
fer for Reference Skill if and only if it is a Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent
mechanism.
In this paper, we propose a different strenghtening of the ethical principle of
Solidarity. We propose to divide (take away) the income gain (loss), generated
by a change in the skill profile, on the basis of the information contained in
individuals’ ‘minimal rights’. The minimal right of an individual equals the
amount that remains from the total sum of income when all other individuals
have received their ‘claim’. The claim of an individual depends on her exerted
effort level but does not depend on her innate skill. The minimal right of an
individual is not allowed to be negative nor to exceed the individual’s claim. In
the division of the income gain (loss), priority is given to an individual with a
higher claim, which is due to higher exerted effort, once the total sum of income
exceeds the individual-specific threshold where her minimal right becomes pos-
itive. The crucial distinction between the ethical principle of ‘Minimal Rights
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based Solidarity’ proposed in this paper and the ethical principles of Additive
or Multiplicative Solidarity is that the way solidarity is performed under Min-
imal Rights based Solidarity depends on the particular economy considered,
i.e. depends on the total sum of income available. Loosely speaking, the way
we divide (take away) the income gain (loss) in an economy with a high total
sum of income is considerably different from the way we divide (take away) the
income gain (loss) in an economy with a low total sum of income.
Given the introduction of claims, our analysis shows similarities with the liter-
ature on bankruptcy problems and surplus sharing problems. In a bankruptcy
problem, a fixed amount of money must be allocated on the basis of monetary
claims that sum up to more than can be divided. The objective is to design
allocation mechanisms that associate with each claims problem a division of the
amount available over the claimants. We refer to Thomson (2003) for an exten-
sive survey of the literature on conflicting claims problems. In a surplus sharing
problem, an amount of money that exceeds the total sum of claims must be
divided over all claimants. An extensive survey on surplus sharing problems is
Moulin (2002). It is not hard to see that the fair income redistribution problem
can formally be interpreted as a conflicting claims (surplus sharing) problem
where the total sum of income before redistribution has to be divided over a
population of claimants. Readers familiar with the conflicting claims/surplus
sharing literature will note that the Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism is for-
mally similar to (an unconstrained version of) the Equal Losses/Equal surplus
sharing mechanism (see Herrero et al. (1999)) and that the Proportionally Ad-
justed Equivalent mechanism is formally similar to the Proportional mechanism,
probably the most popular mechanism in practice for both conflicting claims and
surplus sharing problems. Nevertheless, many of the ethical principles imposed
in the conflicting claims literature and the fair income redistribution literature
are very different. We stress that this paper aims at contributing to the lit-
erature on fair income distribution. A deeper exploration of the intersection
between both strands of the literature is postponed for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we first present the model
(section 2.1). Then, we state different ethical principles, introduce the families
of Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms and Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent
mechanisms formally and discuss their characterizations (section 2.2). In sec-
tion 3, we first argue why we believe that there is room for a new principle
of solidarity. We introduce the notion of minimal rights and propose to use
minimal rights to divide an extra amount of income generated by a change in
the skill profile (section 3.1). Then, we state two solidarity axioms that, when
imposed together, constitute the central Minimal Rights based Solidarity prin-
ciple of this paper (section 3.2). Subsequently, we characterize two families of
Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that implement this solidarity
principle (section 3.3). A concluding discussion (section 4) is provided.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
The fair monetary compensation model used in this paper is a one-dimensional
version of the quasi-linear model in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007) which is due
to Bossert (1995). Denote N = {1, . . . , n} the finite population of size n ≥ 2.
Let x ∈ R be an amount of transferable resource. The characteristic which
elicits compensation, hereafter called ‘skill’, is y ∈ Y and Y is an interval of R.
Denote yN = (y1, . . . , yn) the skill profile in the population. The characteristic
which does not elicit compensation, hereafter called ‘effort’, is z ∈ Z and Z is
an interval of R. Effort is not influenced by redistribution as incentive issues
are not taken up in the model. Denote zN = (z1, . . . , zn) the effort profile in the
population. Without loss of generality, we assume that individuals are ranked
such that z1 ≥ . . . ≥ zn. An economy e = (yN , zN ) is the pair of characteristics’
profiles. Denote E the set of economies.
We assume that utility functions are quasi-linear, i.e. u(xi, yi, zi) = xi+v(yi, zi).
In the context of this paper u : R×Y × Z → R measures a monetary outcome,
namely final income after redistribution. The function v : Y × Z → R++
describes the pre-tax income function. We assume that v is continuous and
strictly increasing in y and z. Furthermore, we assume that v is not additively
separable in y and z, i.e. v(yi, zi) cannot be written as v1(yi) + v2(zi).1 Denote
R =
∑
i∈N v(yi, zi) the total sum of pre-tax incomes.
Let the transferable resource xi be an element of an allocation xN = (x1, . . . , xn)
∈ Rn. We assume that the total amount to be distributed is 0, such that we
are looking at a redistribution problem. An allocation for the economy e ∈ E is
feasible when
∑
i∈N xi = 0. The set of feasible allocations for an economy e ∈ E
is denoted F (e). Notice that all feasible allocations are Pareto efficient since we
ruled out free disposal in the definition of feasibility. An allocation mechanism
is denoted S : E → Rn, such that, for all e ∈ E , S(e) ⊆ F (e). Let S be the set
of all allocation mechanisms.
Let y˜ ∈ Y be the reference skill. We assume throughout the paper that this
constant parameter is exogenously determined by the social planner. Denote
v(y˜, zi) the reference income of individual i. It equals the pre-tax income that
an individual would receive when exerting her effort level zi but having skill y˜
instead of her own skill yi. Denote R˜ =
∑
i∈N v(y˜, zi) the total sum of reference
incomes.
We introduce a function g : Z → R++ that assigns to each individual a claim
that depends on the individual’s effort but does not depend on the individual’s
skill. Hence, two individuals with identical effort but different skills (and hence
1When v is additively separable in y and z, a natural way to redistribute income (that
satisfies both the principal of compensation and the principal of natural reward) is to make
each individual’s income after redistribution equal to the average contribution of yN plus the
individual contribution of zi in the income generating process (Bossert (1995)).
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different pre-tax incomes) have identical claims in the redistribution problem.
We assume that g is continuous and strictly increasing in z. Denote g the
claims vector and C =
∑
i∈N g(zi) the total sum of claims. A conflicting claims
problem is a pair (g, R) ∈ Rn++ × R++, such that C ≥ R. A surplus sharing
problem is a pair (g, R) ∈ Rn++ × R++, such that C < R. One particular
example to model claims within the context of fair income redistribution is to
use reference incomes as claims, i.e. g(zi) = v(y˜, zi) for all i ∈ N (see infra).
2.2 Axioms and allocation mechanisms
Throughout the paper, we consider different axioms that can generically be
described as solidarity axioms. In general, solidarity axioms consider the effect
of a change in one individual’s skill on the allocation. Consider two skill profiles
yN = (y1, . . . , yk, . . . , yn) and y′N = (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
k, . . . , y
′
n), where, for all j in
N\{k}, yj equals y′j . Let e′ = (y′N , zN ) and R′ =
∑
i∈N v(y
′
i, zi). Denote
the change in total pre-tax income ∆R = R′ − R. Without loss of generality,
we assume throughout the paper that e′ yields more pre-tax income than e and
hence ∆R ∈ R++. Solidarity axioms state how these extra resources should be
divided over the population. The weakest form of solidarity, which could be
traced back to Rawls (1971), requires that a change in the skill profile (weakly)
affects all agents’ incomes after redistribution in the same direction. We consider
two stronger versions of solidarity. The first axiom requires that all incomes
change equally. An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Additive Solidarity’
(AS, Bossert (1995)) if:
for all e, e′ ∈ E , for all xN ∈ S(e) and all x′N ∈ S(e′),
x′i + v(y
′
i, zi)− (xi + v(yi, zi)) = x′j + v(y′j , zj)− (xj + v(yj , zj)) for all i, j ∈ N .
The second axiom requires that all individuals’ outcomes change proportionally.
An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Multiplicative Solidarity’ (MS, Iturbe
(1997)) if:
for all e, e′ ∈ E , for all xN ∈ S(e) and all x′N ∈ S(e′),
(x′i + v(y
′
i, zi))(xj + v(yj , zj)) = (xi + v(yi, zi))(x
′
j + v(y
′
j , zj)) for all i, j ∈ N .
We refer to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007) for a proof that AS and MS imply
the principle of compensation (see introduction) under the assumption that the
allocation mechanism is anonymous, i.e. transfers depend on relevant character-
istics and not on individuals’ names.
The following axiom is a weak version of the principle of natural reward (see
introduction) since it only applies the principle of natural reward to economies
where all skills are equal to the reference skill. In these economies no redistri-
bution is performed. An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Equal Transfer for
Reference Skill’ (ETRS, Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)) if:
for all e ∈ E and for all xN ∈ S(e), if yi = y˜ for all i ∈ N , then xi = 0 for all
i ∈ N .
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We also introduce an axiom that requires that all individuals receive their claim
when claims are feasible. An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Claims Feasi-
bility’ if:
for all e ∈ E and for all xN ∈ S(e), if R = C, then xi = −v(yi, zi) + g(zi) for all
i ∈ N .
It is easy to see that Claims Feasibility implies ETRS when reference incomes
are used as claims (i.e. when g(zi) = v(y˜, zi) for all i ∈ N).
We define two families of allocation mechanisms. It concerns a) the family
of Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)
and Fleurbaey (1995) and b) the family of Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent
mechanisms due to Iturbe (1997). Within each family, a particular mechanism
is described by the particular choice of reference skill.
a) The y˜-Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism (Sy˜EE) allocates resources as fol-
lows:
for all e ∈ E and for all i ∈ N , (xi)Sy˜EE = −v(yi, zi) + v(y˜, zi) + 1n (R− R˜).
b) The y˜-Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent mechanism (Sy˜PAE) allocates re-
sources as follows:
for all e ∈ E and for all i ∈ N , (xi)Sy˜PAE = −v(yi, zi) + RR˜v(y˜, zi).
These two families are characterized in the literature as follows:
1) An allocation mechanism S satisfies ETRS and AS if and only if it is an
Sy˜EE (Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)).
2) An allocation mechanism S satisfies ETRS and MS if and only if it is an
Sy˜PAE (Iturbe (1997)).
Figure 1 illustrates for a given y˜ and for every value of R the income distributions
under Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE for an economy with four individuals whose reference
incomes are in a ratio of 6:4:2:1. A glance at the income distributions provides a
clear interpretation of the axioms used in the characterization results. As both
redistribution mechanisms satisfy the axiom of ETRS, income is redistributed
such that every individual receives her reference income when R equals R˜. As a
consequence of Additive Solidarity, the absolute income inequality remains con-
stant under Sy˜EE when R changes (full line). As a consequence of Multiplicative
Solidarity, the relative income inequality remains constant under Sy˜PAE when
R changes (dotted line). In comparing two income distributions with the same
mean, we say that one income distribution is more equal than another income
distribution when the former is obtained from the latter by performing a series
of (Pigou-Dalton) rich-to-poor transfers that do not entail rank reversals. From
figure 1, we see that income distributions under Sy˜PAE are more equal than
income distributions under Sy˜EE when R < R˜, while the reverse holds when
R > R˜.
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Figure 1: Income distributions under Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE
3 Minimal rights based solidarity
The previous section shows how closely the choice of a particular family of
allocation mechanisms depends on the choice which solidarity principle to im-
plement. In this section, we first critically reconsider Additive Solidarity and
Multiplicative Solidarity and argue why there is room for a different solidarity
principle (section 3.1). We introduce the concept of minimal rights and pro-
pose to use the information of individuals’ minimal rights to divide the extra
amount of income generated by a change in the skill profile. We then propose
new solidarity axioms that express this Minimal Rights based Solidarity princi-
ple (section 3.2) and discuss two different families of allocation mechanisms and
their respective income distributions that implement this Minimal Rights based
Solidarity principle (section 3.3).
3.1 Solidarity depending on the total sum of income.
The central idea behind solidarity is that an individual who experienced a change
in her skill should not alone bear the consequences of this change. However, the
ethical principles of Additive and Multiplicative Solidarity are much stronger.
Suppose that due to a change in the skill profile an extra amount of resources
∆R needs to be divided. Additive Solidarity requires that the extra resources
are divided equally over all individuals. A number of objections can be raised
against this particular realization of solidarity:
1) By dividing the extra resources equally, any mechanism that satisfies AS (like
Sy˜EE) can be criticized for not taking differences in exerted effort into account.
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2) Any mechanism that satisfies AS requires that solidarity is borne by all indi-
viduals. This is, however, not a necessary requirement to implement solidarity
through redistribution. For example, it could be desirable to implement a re-
distribution mechanisms that is able to ‘protect’ the poorest individuals from
the burdens of solidarity.
3) Any mechanism that satisfies AS implements this solidarity principle inde-
pendent of the total sum of income. This is, also, not a necessary requirement
to implement solidarity through redistribution. For example, consider the same
economy as in figure 1. Suppose that a social planner wants to design a redis-
tribution mechanism that satisfies ETRS. On top of that, she has a concern for
the income inequalities that arise after redistribution (she wants the post-tax
income distribution as equal as possible). Suppose that she only considers AS
and MS as solidarity principles. From figure 1, we conclude that her preferred
solidarity principle is MS when R < R˜, while it is AS when R > R˜.
Objections 2 and 3 can also be raised against Multiplicative Solidarity. Con-
cerning objection 1, MS does take differences in effort into account but it does
so in one particular way. More precisely, any mechanism that satisfies MS
(like Sy˜PAE) divides the extra resources proportionally to individuals’ reference
incomes.2
In what follows, we introduce a new principle of solidarity. Differences in effort
are taken into account when dividing the extra resources, but need not neces-
sarily be expressed through differences in reference incomes. More generally,
differences in effort are reflected through differences in claims. Moreover, our
precise realization of solidarity does not only depend on the claims vector but
also on the total sum of pre-tax income available. In other words, we take,
besides g, also R into account when dividing the extra resources. It will turn
out that, for some amounts of R, solidarity will not be borne by all individuals.
Let us make our solidarity principle more precise.
We propose to base the division of extra resources on individuals’ minimal rights,
a concept originating from seminal contributions of O’Neill (1982) and Aumann
and Maschler (1985) in the conflicting claims literature.3
Definition (minimal rights) The minimal right of an individual equals the
amount that remains from the total sum of pre-tax income when all other indi-
viduals have received their claim. However, the minimal right is not allowed to
be negative nor to exceed the individual’s own claim.
Formally, the minimal right of an individual i equals:
mi (g, R) = min (g(zi),max (R− C−i, 0)),
2I.e.,
x′i+v(y
′
i,zi)−(xi+v(yi,zi))
x′j+v(y
′
j ,zj)−(xj+v(yj ,zj))
=
v(y˜,zi)
v(y˜,zj)
for all i, j ∈ N .
3Minimal rights should not be confused with the concept of equal rights introduced in
Maniquet (1998). In a model with production, an allocation mechanism guarantees an equal
right when every individual weakly prefers her bundle over her best choice from a common
opportunity set.
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where
C−i =
∑
j∈N\{i} g(zj) for all i ∈ N .
Figure 2 illustrates the concept of minimal rights. As long as R is smaller than
C−1, all minimal rights are zero. When R exceeds C−1, the minimal right of the
individual with effort level z1 becomes strictly positive. When R exceeds C−2,
the minimal right of the individual with effort level z1 exceeds C−2−C−1 and the
minimal right of the individual with effort level z2 becomes strictly positive. As
R increases, more and more individuals start to get a strictly positive minimal
right and when R exceeds C−n all minimal rights are strictly positive. When
R equals C, every individual has a minimal right equal to her claim. When
R exceeds C, minimal rights do not change anymore, so in all surplus sharing
problems mi (g, R) equals g(zi) for all i in N .
-
0 C−1 C−2 C−n C R
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Figure 2: Minimal rights
An individual with a higher claim (due to higher effort) has a higher minimal
right, provided that the latter is different from zero. A strictly positive minimal
right could be given the interpretation of an uncontested part of the total sum
of income, an amount of resources that the population as a whole concedes
to a particular individual on the basis of their claims. Suppose that R equals
C−2. Then all individuals agree that, once they have received their claim, the
individual with effort level z1 deserves at least her minimal right, i.e. C−2−C−1,
of R. However, minimal rights of different individuals might overlap. Suppose
that R equals C−3. Although there is agreement that the amount C−2−C−1 of
R should only go to the individual with effort level z1, the amount C−3 − C−2
of R is conceded to both the individual with effort level z1 and the individual
with effort level z2.
We envision a solidarity principle based on minimal rights as follows. When total
income changes due to a change in the skill profile, none, some or all minimal
rights may change, depending on g, R and ∆R. Denote ∆mi (g, R,∆R) =
mi (g, R + ∆R) −mi (g, R) the change in the minimal right of individual i due
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to a change of total pre-tax income equal to ∆R. We propose to base the division
of the extra resources on the changes in minimal rights. Consider the following
examples. Suppose that R is smaller than C−1. Take any income distribution as
given and assume that the skill profile improves. First, suppose that R′ is still
smaller than C−1. All minimal rights remain zero: R′ is completely contested
and there is no agreement that any individual deserves a particular amount
of the extra resources. In this case, we propose to divide the extra resources
equally over all individuals. Second, suppose that R′ equals an amount between
C−1 and C−2. The minimal right of the individual with effort level z1 equals
R′−C−1, while the minimal rights of all other individuals remain zero. Now R′
is not completely contested: there is agreement that the individual with effort
level z1 deserves R′ − C−1. In this case, we propose to give the uncontested
amount R′ − C−1 to the individual with effort level z1. The rest, C−1 − R, is
divided equally over all individuals. Third, suppose that R′ equals an amount
between C−2 and C−3. The income level C−1 is completely contested. As
before, we propose to divide the amount C−1 − R equally over all individuals.
Next, the amount C−2 − C−1 is conceded to the individual with effort level
z1 and we propose that the latter receives this amount entirely. Finally, the
amount of R′ − C−2 is conceded to both the individual with effort level z1 and
the individual with effort level z2. We propose to divide this amount equally
between them. The iterative reasoning of the third example can be applied for
higher values of R′, at least until R′ equals C−n. When R′ exceeds C−n, the
amount R′ − C−n is conceded to all individuals. Hence, we propose to divide
R′ − C−n again equally over all individuals. The following section presents
two axioms that, when imposed together, embody the above sketched idea of
solidarity based on minimal rights.
3.2 Solidarity axioms
The first axiom weakens the axiom of Additive Solidarity by requiring an equal
treatment of two individuals in the allocation of the extra resources only when
their minimal rights change equally. A redistribution mechanism S satisfies
‘Additive Solidarity for Equal Changes in Minimal Rights’ (AS∗) if:
for all e, e′ ∈ E , for all xN ∈ S(e) and all x′N ∈ S(e′), and for all i, j ∈ N ,
if ∆mi (g, R,∆R) = ∆mj (g, R,∆R) ,
then x′i + v(y
′
i, zi)− (xi + v(yi, zi)) = x′j + v(y′j , zj)− (xj + v(yj , zj)).
The second axiom gives priority in the allocation of the extra resources to indi-
viduals with a strictly positive change in their minimal rights over individuals
whose minimal rights remain constant. The axiom presented here is very weak.
It only focuses on the case where the population can be partitioned in two dis-
joint subsets: the subset of individuals whose change in minimal rights equals
the change in total pre-tax income and the subset of individuals whose minimal
rights do not change at all. The axiom states that, when the former subset
is non-empty, the extra resources should be divided only among individuals
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belonging to that former subset. By excluding individuals in performing sol-
idarity, the axiom is clearly incompatible with AS or MS. Formally, denote
N1 = {i ∈ N |∆mi (g, R,∆R) = ∆R} the subset of individuals whose change in
minimal rights equals the change in total pre-tax income. Denote N c1 the com-
plement of N1 (with respect to N). Denote N2 = {i ∈ N |∆mi (g, R,∆R) = 0}
the subset of individuals whose minimal rights do not change. A redistribution
mechanism S satisfies ‘Priority’ if:
for all e, e′ ∈ E , for all xN ∈ S(e) and all x′N ∈ S(e′),
if ∆R is such that N1 6= ∅ and N c1 = N2,
then
∑
i∈N1 (x
′
i + v(y
′
i, zi)− xi − v(yi, zi)) = ∆R.
Both axioms together imply the paper’s central solidarity idea of Minimal
Rights based Solidarity.4 In other words, by imposing AS∗ and Priority,
the division of any amount of extra resources over the population is implied.
The intuition is the following. As v is continuous and strictly increasing in y,
any ∆R can be divided in specific subchanges that are constructed in such a
way that, for each of them, the population N is partitioned in N1 and N2. If,
for a subchange, N1 = N or N2 = N , AS∗ guarantees an equal division of
the subchange over all individuals. If, for a subchange, N1 and N2 are both
non-empty, Priority guarantees that the subchange is divided only among the
individuals in N1 and AS∗ guarantees that the subchange is divided equally
over the latter individuals. The complete division of ∆R is obtained by adding
up the divisions of the subchanges. We state Minimal Rights based Solidarity
formally in Appendix.
3.3 Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms
Fair income redistribution mechanisms that satisfy Minimal Rights based Sol-
idarity are denoted Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms. In order to
characterize one particular family of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mech-
anisms, it suffices to combine Minimal Rights based Solidarity independently
with one other axiom that for one specific R implies one specific income distri-
bution. An obvious candidate is the axiom of Claims Feasibility. Combining
4One referee suggested to consider a weakening of Multiplicative Solidarity. A redistribu-
tion mechanism S satisfies ‘Multiplicative Solidarity for Equal Changes in Minimal
Rights’ (MS∗) if:
for all e, e′ ∈ E, for all xN ∈ S(e) and all x′N ∈ S(e′), and for all i, j ∈ N ,
if ∆mi (g, R,∆R) = ∆mj (g, R,∆R) ,
then
(
x′i + v(y
′
i, zi)
)
(xj + v(yj , zj)) = (xi + v(yi, zi)) (x
′
j + v(y
′
j , zj)).
Combining MS∗ with Priority leads to a multiplicative version of Minimal Rights based
Solidarity. In our opinion, MS∗ has slightly less appeal than AS∗. We find it more arbitrary
to proportionally (rather than equally) reward equal changes in minimal rights, especially as
the latter exemplify equal concessions of total income. We do not explore this multiplicative
version of Minimal Rights based Solidarity througout the paper but we comment on it in the
concluding discussion (see footnote 5).
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Minimal Rights based Solidarity and Claims Feasibility characterizes the follow-
ing mechanism.
A Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanism SgMRE/CF allocates resources
as follows:
for all e ∈ E ,
(1) when C−n ≤ R :
(xi)SgMRE/CF = −v(yi, zi) + g(zi) + R−Cn for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) :
(xi)SgMRE/CF = −v(yi, zi)+g(zi)+C−n−Cn −
n−1∑
h=k+1
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+R−C−(k+1)k
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
(xj)SgMRE/CF = −v(yj , zj) + g(zj) + C−n−Cn −
n−1∑
h=j
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n− 1} and
(xn)SgMRE/CF = −v(yn, zn) + g(zn) + C−n−Cn ,
(3) when R < C−1 :
(xi)SgMRE/CF = −v(yi, zi) + g(zi) + C−n−Cn −
n−1∑
h=i
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+ R−C−1n
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and
(xn)SgMRE/CF = −v(yn, zn) + g(zn) + C−n−Cn + R−C−1n .
Proposition 1 S = SgMRE/CF ⇔ S satisfies Minimal Rights based Solidarity
and Claims Feasibility.
The proof of proposition 1 can be found in Appendix.
Figure 3 depicts for every value of R the income distributions under an SgMRE/CF
for an economy with four individuals whose claims are in a ratio of 6:4:2:1.
Because SgMRE/CF satisfies Claims Feasibility, income is redistributed such that
every individual receives her claim when R equals C. When, due to a change in
the skill profile, R becomes higher than C, every individual receives her claim
plus an equal part of R − C. When R becomes lower than C, every individual
receives an income that is lower than her claim. As long as R is higher than
C−4, the loss of total pre-tax income is equally borne by all individuals. Simi-
larly, when R becomes smaller than C−1, the loss C−1 −R is borne equally by
all individuals. But, for any R between C−3 and C−4, the income of the poorest
12
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Figure 3: Income distributions under SgMRE/CF
individual remains constant. Similarly, for any R between C−2 and C−3, the
incomes of the poorest and second poorest individual remain constant and,
for any R between C−1 and C−2, the richest individual alone is saddled with
the entire cost of keeping the incomes of all other individuals constant. These
observations demonstrate that, for some values of R, Minimal Rights based
Solidarity implies that solidarity is not always borne by all individuals.
In general, SgMRE/CF does not satisfy ETRS. For example, when R˜ < C−1, the
post-tax incomes of the individuals with effort levels z1 and z2 are equal under
SgMRE/CF and cannot correspond with the unequal reference incomes v(y˜, z1)
and v(y˜, z2). However, when reference incomes are used as claims (R˜ = C),
Claims Feasibility can be replaced by the weaker axiom ETRS in the charac-
terization of SgMRE/CF .
Corollary 1 Suppose g(zi) = v(y˜, zi) for all i ∈ N . Then S = SgMRE/CF ⇔ S
satisfies Minimal Rights based Solidarity and ETRS.
A debatable property of SgMRE/CF (and of Sy˜EE as well), illustrated in Figure
3, is that the poorest individuals might end up with a negative income after
redistribution when R is sufficiently low. Our ethical intuition may lead us to
consider a minimal amount of redistribution that we at least want to perform.
Suppose that the poorest in society could not satisfy their basic needs when they
receive a negative income after redistribution. Society wants to exclude this pos-
sibility in every situation by incorporating the requirement of a non-negative
income after redistribution for all individuals in the construction of the redis-
tribution mechanism. A redistribution mechanism S satisfies ‘Participation’
(Maniquet (1998)) if:
for all e ∈ E , for all xN ∈ S(e), xi + v(yi, zi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
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An implication of Participation is that, when R converges to zero, all incomes
should also converge to zero. Combining Participation with Minimal Rights
based Solidarity characterizes the following mechanism.
A Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanism SgMRE/P allocates resources
as follows:
for all e ∈ E ,
(1) when R < C−1 :
(xi)SgMRE/P = −v(yi, zi) + Rn for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) :
(xi)SgMRE/P = −v(yi, zi) + C−1n +
k∑
h=i
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+ R−C−(k+1)k
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
(xj)SgMRE/P = −v(yj , zj) + C−1n for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
(3) when C−n ≤ R :
(xi)SgMRE/P = −v(yi, zi) + C−1n +
n−1∑
h=i
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+ R−C−nn
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and
(xn)SgMRE/P = −v(yn, zn) + C−1n + R−C−nn .
Proposition 2 S = SgMRE/P ⇔ S satisfies Minimal Rights based Solidarity
and Participation.
The proof of proposition 2 can be found in Appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates, for the same economy as in figure 3, the income distributions
under SgMRE/P .
An equal distribution of income prevails as long as all minimal rights are zero.
More generally, when R is lower than or equal to C−i for some i in N , all in-
dividuals with z lower than or equal to zi receive the same income. Clearly, as
SgMRE/CF and SgMRE/P are different mechanisms, Participation is incompat-
ible with Claims Feasibility when Minimal Rights based Solidarity is imposed.
Furthermore, when reference incomes are used as claims, Participation is also
incompatible with ETRS when Minimal Rights based Solidarity is imposed.
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Figure 4: Income distributions under SgMRE/P
4 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we propose to use individuals’ minimal rights to divide an extra
amount of income generated by a change in the skill profile in a model where
individuals with different levels of skills exert different levels of effort. Prior-
ity is given to individuals with a positive minimal right, which ensures that
the way solidarity is performed depends on the total sum of income available
in society. We characterize two families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian
mechanisms. SgMRE/CF guarantees each individual her claim when claims are
feasible. SgMRE/P guarantees a non-negative income after redistribution for all
individuals.
We end the paper by discussing (i) the post-tax income inequalities that arise
under the different mechanisms and (ii) the incompatibility between Participa-
tion and Claims Feasibility when Minimal Rights based Solidarity is imposed.
The tightness of propositions 1 and 2 is demonstrated in Appendix.
(i) An SgMRE/P redistributes incomes very equally. It is easy to check that, for
every value of R, the income distribution under SgMRE/P is more equal than
the income distribution under SgMRE/CF .
When reference incomes are used as claims, some additional conclusions can be
drawn from comparing figures 1 and 3:
- In economies where every individual has a strictly positive minimal right
(C−n < R), an SgMRE/CF redistributes income just like an Sy˜EE . Both mech-
anisms redistribute income more equally than an Sy˜PAE in all surplus sharing
problems.
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- In economies where some but not all minimal rights are strictly positive (C−1 <
R ≤ C−n), the income distribution under an SgMRE/CF is more equal than the
income distribution under an Sy˜EE .
- In economies where all minimal rights are zero (R ≤ C−1), absolute income
inequalities remain constant under an SgMRE/CF and under an Sy˜EE when R
changes, but incomes are more equally distributed under the former mechanism.
(ii) The incompatibility between Participation and Claims Feasibility under
Minimal Rights based Solidarity (imposing AS∗ and Priority together), is due
to AS∗ rather than Priority.5
When Priority is dropped, imposing Participation, AS∗ and Claims Feasibility
still leads to an incompatibility. This is best explained as follows. Start from
an income distribution (0, 0, . . . , 0) when R converges to zero (Participation).
Now suppose R′ equals C. Then, by Claims Feasibility, individual n should
receive g(zn). Note that the subchanges of ∆R for which all minimal rights
change equally are C−1 (=
n∑
i=2
g(zi)) and C − C−n (= g(zn)). Hence, by AS∗,
individual n is certain to receive 1n
(
n∑
i=2
g(zi) + g(zn)
)
. Denote A the amount
that individual n further receives from the division of C−n − C−1. Then, for
any A ∈ [0, C−n −C−1] and given our assumption that claims are increasing in
z, the condition 1n
(
n∑
i=2
g(zi) + g(zn)
)
+ A = g(zn) cannot hold in general.
When AS∗ is dropped, Participation, Priority and Claims Feasibility are com-
patible but do not characterize a unique family of redistribution mechanisms.
The intuition is clear: Participation describes a precise income distribution
when R converges to zero, Claims Feasibility describes a precise income distri-
bution when R equals C and Priority only describes precise income transfers
between C−1 and C−2 (only the income of individual with effort z1 changes),
which together is not enough to describe a precise allocation mechanism for all
values of R. For all values of R ≤ C, we illustrate in figure 5 for the same
economy as in figures 3 and 4 (i) the most equal income distribution (upper
panel) and (ii) the most unequal income distribution (lower panel) that can be
5This conclusion cannot be drawn if we consider the multiplicative version of Minimal
Rights based Solidarity (imposing MS∗ and Priority together) and use reference incomes as
claims. When Priority is dropped, Participation, ETRS and MS∗ are compatible (because
Sy˜PAE is the unique mechanism satisfying Participation, ETRS and MS and MS
∗ is weaker
than MS). However, imposing Participation, ETRS, MS∗ and Priority leads to an incompat-
ibility. This is best explained as follows. Denote Sprop-gMRE/P the mechanism that satisfies
Participation, MS∗ and Priority. Start from an income distribution (0, 0, . . . , 0) (Participa-
tion). By MS∗, Sy˜PAE = Sprop-gMRE/P for any R between 0 and C−1 and, furthermore,
relative income inequality remains constant for any R between C−n and C. But, by the in-
terplay of MS∗ and Priority, for any R between C−1 and C−n, the income distribution under
Sprop-gMRE/P is obtained from the income distribution under Sy˜PAE by a series of poor-
to-rich transfers (i.e. by transfers from individuals with a zero change in minimal rights to
individuals with a strictly positive change in minimal rights). As Sy˜PAE redistributes income
more equally than Sprop-gMRE/P , the latter does not satisfy ETRS.
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obtained from a redistribution mechanism that satisfies Participation, Priority
and Claims Feasibility.
-
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Figure 5: The most equal and the most unequal income distributions under a
mechanism satisfying Participation, Priority and Claims Feasibility
Appendix: Proofs
First, Lemma 1 states formally the solidarity idea of Minimal Rights based
Solidarity, i.e. how a change in the total sum of pre-tax income is divided over
the population such that the axioms of AS∗ and Priority are satisfied. Second,
propositions 1 and 2 are proved. Third, the tightness of propositions 1 and 2 is
demonstrated.
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Lemma 1 (Minimal Rights based Solidarity): Consider ∆R > 0 due to a
skill change from yi to y′i of an individual i in N . Denote di = x
′
i + v(y
′
i, zi) −
(xi + v(yi, zi));
∑
i∈N di = ∆R. One of five possible situations occurs:
(1) when R′ ≤ C−1 or C−n ≤ R :
di = ∆Rn for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < R′ < C−(k+1) :
di = ∆Rk for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
dj = 0 for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
(3) when, for k ≤ n − 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) and, for 2 ≤ l ≤ n, C−l ≤ R′ <
C−(l+1) and k < l :6
di =
C−(k+1)−R
k +
l−1∑
h=k+1
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+ R
′−C−l
l for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
dj =
l−1∑
h=j
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+ R
′−C−l
l for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , l − 1} and
dl =
R′−C−l
l and
dq = 0 for all q ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},
(4) when R ≤ C−1 and, for l ≤ n− 1, C−l ≤ R′ < C−(l+1) :
di =
C−1−R
n +
l∑
h=i
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+ R
′−C−(l+1)
l for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and
dj =
C−1−R
n for all j ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},
(5) when R ≤ C−1 and C−n ≤ R′ :
di =
C−1−R
n +
n−1∑
h=i
(
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
)
+ R
′−C−n
n for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and
dn =
C−1−R
n +
R′−C−n
n .
Proof. Suppose the antecedent of (1) is true. None of the minimal rights
change and the division of ∆R is obtained by AS∗. Suppose the antecedent
of (2) is true. There are two groups of individuals. For individuals 1 to k
minimal rights change equally. For individuals k+ 1 to n minimal rights do not
change. AS∗ implies that, within each group, all individuals are treated in the
same way. Priority requires that the first group receives ∆R. The division of
∆R then follows straightforwardly. Suppose the antecedent of (3) is true. As
v is continuous and strictly increasing in y, there exist for individual i unique
6When l = n, define C−(l+1) = +∞.
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intermediary skill levels yˆki , yˆ
k+1
i , . . . , yˆ
l
i such that, ceteris paribus, the total sum
of pre-tax income equals C−k, C−(k+1), . . . , C−l respectively. Now consider skill
changes from yi to yˆki , yˆ
k
i to yˆ
k+1
i ,. . ., yˆ
l
i to y
′
i such that the total change of pre-
tax income equals C−k−R,C−(k+1)−C−k, . . . , R′−C−l respectively. For each of
these subchanges there are two groups of individuals: (i) a group whose change
in minimal rights is equal to the subchange and (ii) a group whose minimal
rights do not change. AS∗ implies that within each group all individuals are
treated in the same way, whereas Priority requires that the first group receives
the subchange. Hence, the subchange is equally divided among the individuals
of the first group. The division of ∆R is obtained from applying AS∗ and
Priority to the division of these subchanges. The division of ∆R under (4) and
(5) is obtained by similar reasoning as in (3). 
Proof of proposition 1
S = SgMRE/CF ⇔ S satisfies AS∗, Priority and Claims Feasibility.
Proof. We only prove (⇐). Consider an economy e¯ = (y¯N , zN ) for which
R¯ = C. By Claims Feasibility, x¯i = −v(yi, zi) + g(zi) for all i in N and
individuals’ final incomes are equal to their claims. Call this the ‘initial income
distribution’. Rather than successively considering (at most) n changes from y¯N
to yN and using Lemma 1 successively to divide the intermediate subchanges
in total pre-tax income (a process where in many cases previous subchanges
in total pre-tax income would cancel out), we immediately use Lemma 1 to
divide ∆R. The transfers of (1) in the definition of SgMRE/CF then follow from
adding to the initial income distribution the transfers described in case (1) in
lemma 1. The transfers of (2) then follow from subtracting of the initial income
distribution the transfers described in case (3) with l = n in lemma 1. The
transfers of (3) then follow from subtracting of the initial income distribution
the transfers described in case (5) in lemma 1. 
Proof of proposition 2
S = SgMRE/P ⇔ S satisfies AS∗, Priority and Participation.
Proof. We only prove (⇐). Participation requires that, when R converges
to zero, all incomes also converge to zero. Let (0, 0, . . . , 0) be the initial income
distribution. Now, use Lemma 1 to divide ∆R. The transfers of (1) in the
definition of SgMRE/P are then described in case (1) in lemma 1. The transfers
of (2) are then described in case (4) in lemma 1. The transfers of (3) are then
described in case (5) in lemma 1. 
Tightness results
The axioms used in the characterization of SgMRE/CF are independent. For
example, when reference incomes are used as claims, Sy˜EE satisfies Claims Fea-
sibility and AS∗ but violates Priority. All mechanisms that implement one of
the two income distributions depicted in figure 5 for an economy with four in-
dividuals whose claims are in a ratio of 6:4:2:1 satisfy Claims Feasibility and
Priority but violate AS∗. SgMRE/P satisfies AS∗ and Priority but violates
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Claims Feasibility. The axioms used in the characterization of SgMRE/P are
also independent. A straightforward example of a mechanism that satisfies Par-
ticipation and AS∗ but violates Priority is the equal division of income. All
mechanisms that implement one of the two income distributions depicted in fig-
ure 5 for an economy with four individuals whose claims are in a ratio of 6:4:2:1
satisfy Participation and Priority but violate AS∗. Finally, SgMRE/CF satisfies
AS∗ and Priority but violates Participation.
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